Political Realism in International
Relations:
In the discipline of
international relations, there are contending general theories or theoretical
perspectives. Realism, also known as political realism, is a view of
international politics that stresses its competitive and conflictual side. It
is usually contrasted with idealism or liberalism, which tends to emphasize
cooperation. Realists consider the principal actors in the international arena
to be states, which are concerned with their own security, act in pursuit of
their own national interests, and struggle for power. The negative side of the
realists’ emphasis on power and self-interest is often their skepticism
regarding the relevance of ethical norms to relations among states. National
politics is the realm of authority and law, whereas international politics,
they sometimes claim, is a sphere without justice, characterized by active or
potential conflict among states.
Not all realists,
however, deny the presence of ethics in international relations. The
distinction should be drawn between classical realism—represented by such
twentieth-century theorists as Reinhold Niebuhr and Hans Morgenthau—and radical
or extreme realism. While classical realism emphasizes the concept of national
interest, it is not the Machiavellian doctrine “that anything is justified by
reason of state” (Bull 1995, 189). Nor does it involve the glorification of war
or conflict. The classical realists do not reject the possibility of moral
judgment in international politics. Rather, they are critical of
moralism—an abstract moral discourse that does not take into account political
realities. They assign supreme value to successful political action based on
prudence: the ability to judge the rightness of a given action from among
possible alternatives on the basis of its likely political consequences.
Realism encompasses a
variety of approaches and claims a long theoretical tradition. Among its
founding fathers, Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Hobbes are the names most usually
mentioned. Twentieth-century classical realism has today been largely replaced
by neorealism, which is an attempt to construct a more scientific approach to
the study of international relations. Both classical realism and neorealism
have been subjected to criticism from IR theorists representing liberal,
critical, and post-modern perspectives.
- 1. The Roots of the Realist Tradition
- 1.1 Thucydides and the Importance of
Power
- 1.2 Machiavelli’s Critique of the Moral
Tradition
- 1.3 Hobbes’s Anarchic State of Nature
- 2. Twentieth Century Classical Realism
- 3. Neorealism
- 4. Conclusion: The Cautionary and
Changing Character of Realism
- Bibliography
- Academic Tools
- Other Internet Resources
- Related Entries
1. The
Roots of the Realist Tradition
1.1
Thucydides and the Importance of Power
Like other classical
political theorists, Thucydides (c. 460–c. 400 B.C.E.) saw politics as
involving moral questions. Most importantly, he asks whether relations among
states to which power is crucial can also be guided by the norms of justice.
His History of the Peloponnesian War is in fact neither a work
of political philosophy nor a sustained theory of international relations. Much
of this work, which presents a partial account of the armed conflict between
Athens and Sparta that took place from 431 to 404 B.C.E., consists of paired
speeches by personages who argue on opposing sides of an issue. Nevertheless, if History is described as the only acknowledged classical
text in international relations, and if it inspires theorists from Hobbes to
contemporary international relations scholars, this is because it is more than
a chronicle of events, and a theoretical position can be extrapolated from it.
Realism is expressed in the very first speech of the Athenians recorded in History—a
speech given at the debate that took place in Sparta just before the war.
Moreover, a realist perspective is implied in the way Thucydides explains the
cause of the Peloponnesian War, and also in the famous “Melian Dialogue,” in
the statements made by the Athenian envoys.
1.1.1
General Features of Realism in International Relations
International
relations realists emphasize the constraints imposed on politics by the nature
of human beings, whom they consider egoistic, and by the absence of international
government. Together these factors contribute to a conflict-based paradigm of
international relations, in which the key actors are states, in which power and
security become the main issues, and in which there is little place for
morality. The set of premises concerning state actors, egoism, anarchy, power,
security, and morality that define the realist tradition are all present in
Thucydides.
(1) Human nature is a
starting point for classical political realism. Realists view human beings as
inherently egoistic and self-interested to the extent that self-interest
overcomes moral principles. At the debate in Sparta, described in Book I of
Thucydides’ History, the Athenians affirm the priority of
self-interest over morality. They say that considerations of right and wrong
have “never turned people aside from the opportunities of aggrandizement
offered by superior strength” (chap. 1 par. 76).
(2) Realists, and
especially today’s neorealists, consider the absence of government,
literally anarchy, to be the primary determinant of international
political outcomes. The lack of a common rule-making and enforcing authority
means, they argue, that the international arena is essentially a self-help
system. Each state is responsible for its own survival and is free to define
its own interests and pursue power. Anarchy thus leads to a situation in
which power has the overriding role in shaping interstate relations. In the
words of the Athenian envoys at Melos, without any common authority that can
enforce order, “the independent states survive [only] when they are powerful”
(5.97).
(3) Insofar as
realists envision the world of states as anarchic, they likewise view security
as a central issue. To attain security, states try to increase their power and
engage in power-balancing for the purpose of deterring potential aggressors.
Wars are fought to prevent competing nations from becoming militarily stronger.
Thucydides, while distinguishing between the immediate and underlying causes of
the Peloponnesian War, does not see its real cause in any of the particular
events that immediately preceded its outbreak. He instead locates the cause of
the war in the changing distribution of power between the two blocs of Greek
city-states: the Delian League, under the leadership of Athens, and the
Peloponnesian League, under the leadership of Sparta. According to him, the
growth of Athenian power made the Spartans afraid for their security, and thus
propelled them into the war (1.23).
(4) Realists are
generally skeptical about the relevance of morality to international politics.
This can lead them to claim that there is no place for morality in
international relations, that there is a tension between demands of morality
and requirements of successful political action, that states have their own
morality that is different from customary morality, or that morality if
employed at all, is merely used instrumentally to justify states’ conduct. A
clear case of the rejection of ethical norms in relations among states can be
found in the “Melian Dialogue” (5.85–113). This dialogue relates to the events
of 416 B.C.E. when Athens invaded the island of Melos. The Athenian envoys
presented the Melians with a choice, destruction or surrender, and from the
outset asked them not to appeal to justice, but to think only about their
survival. In the envoys’ words, “We both know that the decisions about justice
are made in human discussions only when both sides are under equal compulsion,
but when one side is stronger, it gets as much as it can, and the weak must
accept that” (5.89). To be “under equal compulsion” means to be under the force
of law, and thus to be subjected to a common lawgiving authority
(Korab-Karpowicz 2006, 234). Since such an authority above states does not
exist, the Athenians argue that in this lawless condition of international
anarchy, the only right is the right of the stronger to dominate the weaker.
They explicitly equate right with might and exclude considerations of justice
from foreign affairs.
1.1.2 The
“Melian Dialogue”—The First Realist-Idealist Debate
We can thus find
strong support for a realist perspective in the statements of the Athenians.
The question remains, however, to what extent their realism coincides with
Thucydides’ own viewpoint. Although substantial passages of the “Melian
Dialogue,” as well as other parts of the History support a
realistic reading, Thucydides’ position cannot be deduced from such selected
fragments, but rather must be assessed on the basis of the wider context of his
book. In fact, even the “Melian Dialogue” itself provides us with a number of
contending views.
Political realism is
usually contrasted by IR scholars with idealism or liberalism, a theoretical
perspective that emphasizes international norms, interdependence among states,
and international cooperation. The “Melian Dialogue,” which is one of the most
frequently commented-upon parts of Thucydides’ History, presents
the classic debate between the idealist and realist views: Can international
politics be based on a moral order derived from the principles of justice, or
will it forever remain the arena of conflicting national interests and power?
For the Melians, who
employ idealistic arguments, the choice is between war and subjection (5.86).
They are courageous and love their country. They do not wish to lose their
freedom, and in spite of the fact that they are militarily weaker than the
Athenians, they are prepared to defend themselves (5.100; 5.112). They base
their arguments on an appeal to justice, which they associate with fairness,
and regard the Athenians as unjust (5.90; 5.104). They are pious, believing
that gods will support their just cause and compensate for their weakness, and
trust in alliances, thinking that their allies, the Spartans, who are also
related to them, will help them (5.104; 5.112). Hence, one can identify in the
speech of the Melians elements of the idealistic or liberal world view: the
belief that nations have the right to exercise political independence, that
they have mutual obligations to one another and will carry out such
obligations, and that a war of aggression is unjust. What the Melians
nevertheless lack are resources and foresight. In their decision to defend
themselves, they are guided more by their hopes than by the evidence at hand or
by prudent calculations.
The Athenian argument
is based on key realist concepts such as security and power and is informed
not by what the world should be, but by what it is. The Athenians disregard any
moral talk and urge the Melians to look at the facts—that is, to recognize
their military inferiority, consider the potential consequences of their
decision, and think about their own survival (5.87; 5.101). There appears to
be a powerful realist logic behind the Athenian arguments. Their position, based
on security concerns and self-interest, seemingly involves reliance on
rationality, intelligence, and foresight. However, upon close examination,
their logic proves to be seriously flawed. Melos, a relatively weak state, does
not pose any real security threat to them. The eventual destruction of Melos
does not change the course of the Peloponnesian War, which Athens will lose a
few years later.
In History,
Thucydides shows that power, if it is unrestrained by moderation and a sense of
justice, brings about the uncontrolled desire for more power. There are no
logical limits to the size of an empire. Drunk with the prospect of glory and
gain, after conquering Melos, the Athenians engage in a war against Sicily.
They pay no attention to the Melian argument that considerations of justice are
useful to all in the longer run (5.90). And, as the Athenians overestimate
their strength and in the end lose the war, their self-interested logic proves
to be very shortsighted indeed.
It is utopian to
ignore the reality of power in international relations, but it is equally blind
to rely on power alone. Thucydides appears to support neither the naive
idealism of the Melians nor the cynicism of their Athenian opponents. He
teaches us to be on guard “against naïve-dreaming on international politics,”
on the one hand, and “against the other pernicious extreme: unrestrained
cynicism,” on the other (Donnelly 2000, 193). If he can be regarded as a
political realist, his realism nonetheless prefigures neither realpolitik,
in which traditional ethics is denied, nor today’s scientific neorealism, in
which moral questions are largely ignored. Thucydides’ realism, neither immoral
nor amoral, can rather be compared to that of Hans Morgenthau, Raymond Aron,
and other twentieth-century classical realists, who, although sensible to the
demands of national interest, would not deny that political actors on the
international scene are subject to moral judgment.
1.2
Machiavelli’s Critique of the Moral Tradition
Idealism in
international relations, like realism, can lay claim to a long tradition.
Unsatisfied with the world as they have found it, idealists have always tried
to answer the question of “what ought to be” in politics. Plato, Aristotle, and
Cicero were all political idealists who believed that there were some universal
moral values on which political life could be based. Building on the work of
his predecessors, Cicero developed the idea of a natural moral law that was
applicable to both domestic and international politics. His ideas concerning
righteousness in the war were carried further in the writings of the Christian
thinkers St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas. In the late fifteenth century,
when Niccolò Machiavelli was born, the idea that politics, including the
relations among states, should be virtuous, and that the methods of warfare
should remain subordinated to ethical standards, still predominated in
political literature.
Machiavelli
(1469–1527) challenged this well-established oral tradition, thus positioning
himself as a political innovator. The novelty of his approach lies in his
critique of classical Western political thought as unrealistic, and in his
separation of politics from ethics. He thereby lays the foundations for modern
politics. In chapter XV of The Prince, Machiavelli announces that
in departing from the teachings of earlier thinkers, he seeks “the effectual
truth of the matter rather than the imagined one.” The “effectual truth” is for
him the only truth worth seeking. It represents the sum of the practical conditions
that he believes are required to make both the individual and the country
prosperous and strong. Machiavelli replaces the ancient virtue (a
moral quality of the individual, such as justice or self-restraint) with virtù,
ability, or vigor. As a prophet of virtù, he promises to lead both
nations and individuals to earthly glory and power.
Machiavellianism is a radical type of political realism
that is applied to both domestic and international affairs. It is a doctrine
that denies the relevance of morality in politics and claims that all means
(moral and immoral) are justified to achieve certain political ends. Although
Machiavelli never uses the phrase ragione di stato or its
French equivalent, raison d’état, what ultimately counts for him is
precisely that: whatever is good for the state, rather than ethical scruples or
norms
Machiavelli justified
immoral actions in politics, but never refused to admit that they are evil. He
operated within the single framework of traditional morality. It became a specific
task of his nineteenth-century followers to develop the doctrine of double
ethics: one public and one private, to push Machiavellian realism to even
further extremes, and to apply it to international relations. By asserting that
“the state has no higher duty than of maintaining itself,” Hegel gave an
ethical sanction to the state’s promotion of its own interest and advantage
against other states (Meinecke 357). Thus he overturned the traditional
morality. The good of the state was perversely interpreted as the highest moral
value, with the extension of national power regarded as a nation’s right and
duty. Referring to Machiavelli, Heinrich von Treitschke declared that the state
was power, precisely in order to assert itself against other equally
independent powers and that the supreme moral duty of the state was to foster
this power. He considered international agreements to be binding only insofar
as it was expedient for the state. The idea of autonomous ethics of state
behavior and the concept of realpolitik were thus introduced.
Traditional ethics was denied and power politics was associated with a “higher”
type of morality. These concepts, along with the belief in the superiority of
Germanic culture, served as weapons with which German statesmen, from the
eighteenth century to the end of the Second World War, justified their policies
of conquest and extermination.
Machiavelli is often
praised for his prudential advice to leaders (which has caused him to be
regarded as a founding master of modern political strategy) and for his defense
of the republican form of government. There are certainly many aspects of his
thought that merit such praise. Nevertheless, it is also possible to see him as
the thinker who bears foremost responsibility for the demoralization of Europe.
The argument of the Athenian envoys presented in Thucydides’ “Melian Dialogue,”
that of Thrasymachus in Plato’s Republic, or that of Carneades, to
whom Cicero refers—all of these challenge the ancient and Christian views of
the unity of politics and ethics. However, before Machiavelli, this amoral or
immoral mode of thinking had never prevailed in the mainstream of Western
political thought. It was the force and timeliness of his justification of
resorting to evil as a legitimate means of achieving political ends that
persuaded so many of the thinkers and political practitioners who followed him.
The effects of Machiavellian ideas, such as the notion that the employment of
all possible means was permissible in war, would be seen on the battlefields of
modern Europe, as mass citizen armies fought against each other to the bitter
end without regard for the rules of justice. The tension between expediency and
morality lost its validity in the sphere of politics. The concept of double
ethics, private and public, that created further damage to traditional,
customary ethics was invented. The doctrine of raison d’état ultimately
led to the politics of Lebensraum, two world wars, and the
Holocaust.
Perhaps the greatest
problem with realism in international relations is that it has a tendency to
slip into its extreme version, which accepts any policy that can benefit the
state at the expense of other states, no matter how morally problematic the
policy is. Even if they do not explicitly raise ethical questions, in the works
of Waltz and of many other of today’s neorealists, double ethics is
presupposed, and words such as realpolitik no longer have the
negative connotations that they had for classical realists, such as Hans
Morgenthau.
1.3 Hobbes’s
Anarchic State of Nature
Thomas Hobbes
(1588–1683) was part of an intellectual movement whose goal was to free the
emerging modern science from the constraints of the classical and scholastic
heritage. According to classical political philosophy, on which the idealist
perspective is based, human beings can control their desires through reason and
can work for the benefit of others, even at the expense of their own benefit.
They are thus both rational and moral agents, capable of distinguishing between
right and wrong, and of making moral choices. They are also naturally social.
With great skill, Hobbes attacks these views. His human beings, extremely
individualistic rather than moral or social, are subject to “a perpetual and
restless desire of power after power, that ceases only in death” (Leviathan XI
2). They therefore inevitably struggle for power. In setting out such ideas,
Hobbes contributes to some of the basic conceptions fundamental to the realist
tradition in international relations, and especially to neorealism. These
include the characterization of human nature as egoistic, the concept of
international anarchy, and the view that politics, rooted in the struggle for
power, can be rationalized and studied scientifically.
One of the most widely
known Hobbesian concepts is that of the anarchic state of nature, seen as
entailing a state of war—and “such a war as is of every man against every man”
(XII 8). He derives his notion of the state of war from his views of both human
nature and the condition in which individuals exist. Since in the state of
nature there is no government and everyone enjoys equal status, every
individual has a right to everything; that is, there are no constraints on an
individual’s behavior. Anyone may at any time use force, and all must
constantly be ready to counter such force with force. Hence, driven by
acquisitiveness, having no moral restraints, and motivated to compete for
scarce goods, individuals are apt to “invade” one another for gain. Being
suspicious of one another and driven by fear, they are also likely to engage in
preemptive actions and invade one another to ensure their own safety. Finally,
individuals are also driven by pride and a desire for glory. Whether for gain,
safety, or reputation, power-seeking individuals will thus “endeavor to destroy
or subdue one another” (XIII 3). In such uncertain conditions where everyone is
a potential aggressor, making war on others is a more advantageous strategy
than peaceable behavior, and one needs to learn that domination over others is
necessary for one’s own continued survival.
Hobbes is primarily
concerned with the relationship between individuals and the state, and his
comments about relations among states are scarce. Nevertheless, what he says
about the lives of individuals in the state of nature can also be interpreted
as a description of how states exist in relation to one another. Once states
are established, the individual drive for power becomes the basis for the
states’ behavior, which often manifests itself in their efforts to dominate
other states and peoples. States, “for their own security,” writes Hobbes,
“enlarge their dominions upon all pretenses of danger and fear of invasion or
assistance that may be given to invaders, [and] endeavor as much as they can,
to subdue and weaken their neighbors” (XIX 4). Accordingly, the quest and
struggle for power lie at the core of the Hobbesian vision of relations among
states. The same would later be true of the model of international relations
developed by Hans Morgenthau, who was deeply influenced by Hobbes and adopted
the same view of human nature. Similarly, the neorealist Kenneth Waltz would
follow Hobbes’ lead regarding international anarchy (the fact that sovereign
states are not subject to any higher common sovereign) as the essential element
of international relations.
By subjecting
themselves to a sovereign, individuals escape the war of all against all which
Hobbes associates with the state of nature; however, this war continues to
dominate relations among states. This does not mean that states are always
fighting, but rather that they have the disposition to fight (XIII 8). With each
state deciding for itself whether or not to use force, war may break out at any
time. The achievement of domestic security through the creation of a state is
then paralleled by a condition of inter-state insecurity. One can argue that if
Hobbes were fully consistent, he would agree with the notion that, to escape
this condition, states should also enter into a contract and submit themselves
to a world sovereign. Although the idea of a world state would find support
among some of today’s realists, this is not a position taken by Hobbes himself.
He does not propose that a social contract among nations be implemented to
bring international anarchy to an end. This is because the condition of
insecurity in which states are placed does not necessarily lead to insecurity
for their citizens. As long as an armed conflict or another type of hostility
between states does not actually break out, individuals within a state can feel
relatively secure.
The denial of the
existence of universal moral principles in the relations among states brings
Hobbes close to the Machiavellians and the followers of the doctrine of raison
d’état. His theory of international relations, which assumes that
independent states, like independent individuals, are enemies by nature,
asocial and selfish, and that there is no moral limitation on their behavior,
is a great challenge to the idealist political vision based on human
sociability and to the concept of the international jurisprudence that is built
on this vision. However, what separates Hobbes from Machiavelli and associates
him more with classical realism is his insistence on the defensive character of
foreign policy. His political theory does not put forward the invitation to do
whatever may be advantageous for the state. His approach to international
relations is prudential and pacific: sovereign states, like individuals, should
be disposed towards peace which is commended by reason.
What Waltz and other
neorealist readers of Hobbes’s works sometimes overlook is that he does not
perceive international anarchy as an environment without any rules. By
suggesting that certain dictates of reason apply even in the state of nature,
he affirms that more peaceful and cooperative international relations are
possible. Neither does he deny the existence of international law. Sovereign
states can sign treaties with one another to provide a legal basis for their
relations. At the same time, however, Hobbes seems aware that international
rules will often prove ineffective in restraining the struggle for power.
States will interpret them to their own advantage, and so international law
will be obeyed or ignored according to the interests of the states affected.
Hence, international relations will always tend to be a precarious affair. This
grim view of global politics lies at the core of Hobbes’s realism.
2.
Twentieth Century Classical Realism
Twentieth-century
realism was born in response to the idealist perspective that dominated
international relations scholarship in the aftermath of the First World War.
The idealists of the 1920s and 1930s (also called liberal internationalists or
utopians) had the goal of building peace in order to prevent another world
conflict. They saw the solution to inter-state problems as being the creation
of a respected system of international law, backed by international
organizations. This interwar idealism resulted in the founding of the League of
Nations in 1920 and in the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 outlawing war and
providing for the peaceful settlements of disputes. U.S. President Woodrow
Wilson, scholars such as Norman Angell, Alfred Zimmern, Raymond B. Fosdick,
and other prominent idealists of the era, gave their intellectual support to
the League of Nations. Instead of focusing on what some might see as the
inevitability of conflict between states and peoples, they chose to emphasize
the common interests that could unite humanity and attempted to appeal to
rationality and morality. For them, the war did not originate in an egoistic human
nature, but rather in imperfect social conditions and political arrangements,
which could be improved. Yet their ideas were already being criticized in the
early 1930s by Reinhold Niebuhr and within a few years by E. H. Carr. The
League of Nations, which the United States never joined, and from which Japan
and Germany withdrew, could not prevent the outbreak of the Second World War.
This fact, perhaps more than any theoretical argument, produced a strong
realist reaction. Although the United Nations, founded in 1945, can still be
regarded as a product of idealist political thinking, the discipline of
international relations was profoundly influenced in the initial years of the
post-war period by the works of “classical” realists such as John H. Herz, Hans
Morgenthau, George Kennan, and Raymond Aron. Then, during the 1950s and 1960s,
classical realism came under the challenge of scholars who tried to introduce a
more scientific approach to the study of international politics. During the
1980s it gave way to another trend in international relations
theory—neorealism.
Since it is impossible
within the scope of this article to introduce all of the thinkers who
contributed to the development of twentieth-century classical realism, E. H.
Carr and Hans Morgenthau, perhaps the most influential among them, have been
selected for discussion here.
2.1 E. H.
Carr’s Challenge to Utopian Idealism
In his main work on
international relations, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, first published
in July 1939, Edward Hallett Carr (1892–1982) attacks the idealist position,
which he describes as “utopianism.” He characterizes this position as
encompassing faith in reason, confidence in progress, a sense of moral
rectitude, and a belief in an underlying harmony of interests. According to the
idealists, war is an aberration in the course of normal life and the way to
prevent it is to educate people for peace, and to build systems of collective
security such as the League of Nations or today’s United Nations. Carr
challenges idealism by questioning its claim to moral universalism and its idea
of the harmony of interests. He declares that “morality can only be relative,
not universal” (19), and states that the doctrine of the harmony of interests
is invoked by privileged groups “to justify and maintain their dominant
position” (75).
Carr uses the concept
of the relativity of thought, which he traces to Marx and other modern
theorists, to show that standards by which policies are judged are the products
of circumstances and interests. His central idea is that the interests of a
given party always determine what this party regards as moral principles, and
hence, these principles are not universal. Carr observes that politicians, for
example, often use the language of justice to cloak the particular interests of
their own countries or to create negative images of other people to justify
acts of aggression. The existence of such instances of morally discrediting a potential
enemy or morally justifying one’s own position shows, he argues, that moral
ideas are derived from actual policies. Policies are not, as the idealists
would have it, based on some universal norms, independent of the interests of the
parties involved.
If specific moral
standards are de facto founded on interests, Carr’s argument goes, there are
also interests underlying what are regarded as absolute principles or universal
moral values. While the idealists tend to regard such values, such as peace or justice,
as universal and claim that upholding them is in the interest of all, Carr
argues against this view. According to him, there are neither universal values
nor universal interests. He claims that those who refer to universal interests
are in fact acting in their own interests (71). They think that what is best
for them is best for everyone, and identify their own interests with the
universal interest of the world at large.
The idealist concept
of the harmony of interests is based on the notion that human
beings can rationally recognize that they have some interests in common and
that cooperation is therefore possible. Carr contrasts this idea with the
reality of conflict of interests. According to him, the world is
torn apart by the particular interests of different individuals and groups. In
such a conflictual environment, the order is based on power, not on morality.
Further, morality itself is the product of power (61). Like Hobbes, Carr
regards morality as constructed by the particular legal system that is enforced
by coercive power. International moral norms are imposed on other countries
by dominant nations or groups of nations that present themselves as the
international community as a whole. They are invented to perpetuate those
nations’ dominance.
Values that idealists
view as good for all, such as peace, social justice, prosperity, and
international order, are regarded by Carr as mere status quo notions.
The powers that are satisfied with the status quo regard the arrangement in
place as just and therefore preach peace. They try to rally everyone around
their idea of what is good. “Just as the ruling class in a community prays for
domestic peace, which guarantees its own security and predominance, … so
international peace becomes a special vested interest of predominant powers”
(76). On the other hand, the unsatisfied powers consider the same arrangement unjust, and so prepare for war. Hence, the way to obtain peace, if it cannot
be simply enforced, is to satisfy the unsatisfied powers. “Those who profit
most by [international] order can in the long run only hope to maintain it by
making sufficient concessions to make it tolerable to those who profit by it
least” (152). The logical conclusion to be drawn by the reader of Carr’s book
is the policy of appeasement.
Carr was a
sophisticated thinker. He recognized that the logic of “pure realism
can offer nothing but a naked struggle for power which makes any kind of
international society impossible” (87). Although he demolishes what he calls “the
current utopia” of idealism, he at the same time attempts to build “a new
utopia,” a realist world order (ibid.). Thus, he acknowledges that human
beings need certain fundamental, universally acknowledged norms and values, and
contradicts his own argument by which he tries to deny universality to any
norms or values. To make further objections, the fact that the language of
universal moral values can be misused in politics for the benefit of one party
or another, and that such values can only be imperfectly implemented in
political institutions, does not mean that such values do not exist. There is a
deep yearning in many human beings, both privileged and unprivileged, for
peace, order, prosperity, and justice. The legitimacy of idealism consists in the
constant attempt to reflect upon and uphold these values. Idealists fail if in
their attempt they do not pay enough attention to the reality of power. On the
other hand, in the world of pure realism, in which all values are made relative
to interests, life turns into nothing more than a power game and is unbearable.
The Twenty Years’
Crisis touches on a
number of universal ideas, but it also reflects the spirit of its time. While
we can fault the interwar idealists for their inability to construct international
institutions strong enough to prevent the outbreak of the Second World War,
this book indicates that interwar realists were likewise unprepared to meet the
challenge. Carr frequently refers to Germany under Nazi rule as if it were a
country like any other. He says that should Germany cease to be an unsatisfied
power and “become supreme in Europe,” it would adopt a language of
international solidarity similar to that of other Western powers (79). The
inability of Carr and other realists to recognize the perilous nature of
Nazism, and their belief that Germany could be satisfied by territorial
concessions, helped to foster a political environment in which the latter was
to grow in power, annex Czechoslovakia at will, and be militarily opposed in
September 1939 by Poland alone.
A theory of
international relations is not just an intellectual enterprise; it has
practical consequences. It influences our thinking and political practice. On
the practical side, the realists of the 1930s, to whom Carr gave intellectual
support, were people opposed to the system of collective security embodied in
the League of Nations. Working within the foreign policy establishments of the
day, they contributed to its weakness. Once they had weakened the League, they
pursued a policy of appeasement and accommodation with Germany as an
alternative to collective security (Ashworth 46). After the annexation of
Czechoslovakia, when the failure of the anti-League realist conservatives
gathered around Neville Chamberlain and of this policy became clear, they tried
to rebuild the very security system they had earlier demolished. Those who
supported collective security were labeled idealists.
2.2 Hans
Morgenthau’s Realist Principles
Hans J. Morgenthau
(1904–1980) developed realism into a comprehensive international relations
theory. Influenced by the Protestant theologian and political writer Reinhold
Niebuhr, as well as by Hobbes, he places selfishness and power-lust at the
center of his picture of human existence. The insatiable human lust for power,
timeless and universal, which he identifies with animus dominandi,
the desire to dominate, is for him the main cause of conflict. As he asserts in
his main work, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace,
first published in 1948, “international politics, like all politics, is a
struggle for power” (25).
Morgenthau
systematizes realism in international relations on the basis of six principles
that he includes in the second edition of Politics among Nations.
As a traditionalist, he opposes the so-called scientists (the scholars who,
especially in the 1950s, tried to reduce the discipline of international
relations to a branch of behavioral science). Nevertheless, in the first
principle, he states that realism is based on objective laws that have their
roots in unchanging human nature (4). He wants to develop realism into both a
theory of international politics and political art, a useful tool of foreign
policy.
The keystone of
Morgenthau’s realist theory is the concept of power or “of
interest defined in terms of power,” which informs his second principle: the
assumption that political leaders “think and act in terms of interest defined
as power” (5). This concept defines the autonomy of politics and allows for
the analysis of foreign policy regardless of the different motives,
preferences, and intellectual and moral qualities of individual politicians.
Furthermore, it is the foundation of a rational picture of politics.
Although, as
Morgenthau explains in the third principle, interest defined as power is a
universally valid category, and indeed an essential element of politics,
various things can be associated with interest or power at different times and
in different circumstances. Its content and the manner of its use are determined
by the political and cultural environment.
In the fourth
principle, Morgenthau considers the relationship between realism and ethics. He
says that while realists are aware of the moral significance of political
action, they are also aware of the tension between morality and the
requirements of successful political action. “Universal moral principles,” he
asserts, “cannot be applied to the actions of states in their abstract
universal formulation, but …they must be filtered through the concrete
circumstances of time and place” (9). These principles must be accompanied by
prudence for as he cautions “there can be no political morality without
prudence; that is, without consideration of the political consequences of
seemingly moral action” (ibid.).
Prudence, and not a conviction of one’s own moral or ideological superiority, should guide
political action. This is stressed in the fifth principle, where Morgenthau
again emphasizes the idea that all state actors, including our own, must be
looked at solely as political entities pursuing their respective interests
defined in terms of power. By taking this point of view vis-à-vis its
counterparts and thus avoiding ideological confrontation, a state would then be
able to pursue policies that respected the interests of other states, while
protecting and promoting its own.
Insofar as power, or
interest defined as power is the concept that defines politics, politics is an
autonomous sphere, as Morgenthau says in his sixth principle of realism. It
cannot be subordinated to ethics. However, ethics does still play a role in
politics. “A man who was nothing but ‘political man’ would be a beast, for he
would be completely lacking in moral restraints. A man who was nothing but
‘moral man’ would be a fool, for he would be completely lacking in prudence”
(12). Political art requires that these two dimensions of human life, power, and
morality, be taken into consideration.
While Morgenthau’s six
principles of realism contain repetitions and inconsistencies, we can
nonetheless obtain from them the following picture: Power or interest is the
central concept that makes politics into an autonomous discipline. Rational
state actors pursue their national interests. Therefore, a rational theory of
international politics can be constructed. Such a theory is not concerned with
the morality, religious beliefs, motives, or ideological preferences of
individual political leaders. It also indicates that in order to avoid
conflicts, states should avoid moral crusades or ideological confrontations, and
look for compromise based solely on the satisfaction of their mutual interests.
Although he defines
politics as an autonomous sphere, Morgenthau does not follow the Machiavellian
route of completely removing ethics from politics. He suggests that, although
human beings are political animals, who pursue their interests, they are moral
animals. Deprived of any morality, they would descend to the level of beasts or
sub-humans. Even if it is not guided by universal moral principles, political
action thus has for Morgenthau moral significance. Ultimately directed toward
the objective of national survival, it also involves prudence. The effective
protection of citizens’ lives from harm is not merely a forceful physical
action; it has prudential and moral dimensions.
Morgenthau regards
realism as a way of thinking about international relations and a useful tool
for devising policies. However, some of the basic conceptions of his theory,
and especially the idea of conflict as stemming from human nature, as well as
the concept of power itself, have provoked criticism.
International
politics, like all politics, is for Morgenthau a struggle for power because of
the basic human lust for power. But regarding every individual as being engaged
in a perpetual quest for power—the view that he shares with Hobbes—is a
questionable premise. Human nature cannot be revealed by observation and
experiment. It cannot be proved by any empirical research, but only disclosed
by philosophy, imposed on us as a matter of belief, and inculcated by
education.
Morgenthau himself
reinforces the belief in the human drive for power by introducing a normative
aspect of his theory, which is rationality. A rational foreign policy is
considered “to be a good foreign policy” (7). But he defines rationality as a
process of calculating the costs and benefits of all alternative policies in
order to determine their relative utility, i.e. their ability to maximize
power. Statesmen “think and act in terms of interest defined as power” (5).
Only the intellectual weakness of policymakers can result in foreign policies that
deviate from a rational course aimed at minimizing risks and maximizing
benefits. Hence, rather than presenting an actual portrait of human affairs,
Morgenthau emphasizes the pursuit of power and the rationality of this pursuit and sets it up as a norm.
As Raymond Aron and
other scholars have noticed, power, the fundamental concept of Morgenthau’s
realism, is ambiguous. It can be either a means or an end in politics. But if
power is only a means for gaining something else, it does not define the nature
of international politics in the way Morgenthau claims. It does not allow us to
understand the actions of states independently from the motives and ideological
preferences of their political leaders. It cannot serve as the basis for
defining politics as an autonomous sphere. Morgenthau’s principles of realism
are thus open to doubt. “Is this true,” Aron asks, “that states, whatever their
regime, pursue the same kind of foreign policy” (597) and that the foreign
policies of Napoleon or Stalin are essentially identical to those of Hitler,
Louis XVI or Nicholas II, amounting to no more than the struggle for power? “If
one answers yes, then the proposition is incontestable, but not very
instructive” (598). Accordingly, it is useless to define the actions of states by
exclusive reference to power, security, or national interest. International
politics cannot be studied independently of the wider historical and cultural
context.
Although Carr and
Morgenthau concentrate primarily on international relations, their realism can
also be applied to domestic politics. To be a classical realist is in general
to perceive politics as a conflict of interests and a struggle for power, and
to seek peace by recognizing common interests and trying to satisfy them,
rather than by moralizing. Bernard Williams and Raymond Geuss, influential
representatives of the new political realism, a movement in contemporary
political theory, criticize what they describe as “political moralism” and
stress the autonomy of politics against ethics. However, political theory
realism and international relations realism seem like two separate research
programs. As noted by several scholars (William Scheuerman, Alison McQueen,
Terry Nardin. and Duncan Bell), those who contribute to realism in political theory
give little attention to those who work on realism in international politics.
3.
Neorealism
In spite of its
ambiguities and weaknesses, Morgenthau’s Politics among Nations became a standard textbook and influenced thinking about international politics for a
generation or so. At the same time, there was an attempt to develop a more
methodologically rigorous approach to theorizing about international affairs.
In the 1950s and 1960s, a large influx of scientists from different fields
entered the discipline of International Relations and attempted to replace the
“wisdom literature” of classical realists with scientific concepts and
reasoning (Brown 35). This in turn provoked a counterattack by Morgenthau and
scholars associated with the so-called English School, especially Hedley Bull,
who defended a traditional approach (Bull 1966).
As a result, the IR
discipline has been divided into two main strands: traditional or
non-positivist and scientific or positivist (neo-positivist). At a later stage, the third strand: post-positivism has been added. The traditionalists raise
normative questions and engage with history, philosophy, and law. The scientists
or positivists stress a descriptive and explanatory form of inquiry, rather
than a normative one. They have established a strong presence in the field.
Already by the mid-1960s, the majority of American students in international
relations were trained in quantitative research, game theory, and other new
research techniques of the social sciences. This, along with the changing
international environment, had a significant effect on the discipline.
The realist assumption
was that the state is the key actor in international politics and that relations
among states are the core of actual international relations. However, with the
receding of the Cold War during the 1970s, one could witness the growing
importance of international and non-governmental organizations, as well as multinational corporations. This development led to a revival of idealist
thinking, which became known as neoliberalism or pluralism. While accepting
some basic assumptions of realism, the leading pluralists, Robert Keohane and
Joseph Nye, have proposed the concept of complex interdependence to
describe this more sophisticated picture of global politics. They would argue
that there can be progress in international relations and that the future does
not need to look like the past.
3.1
Kenneth Waltz’s International System
The realist response
came most prominently from Kenneth N. Waltz, who reformulated realism in
international relations in a new and distinctive way. In his book Theory
of International Politics, first published in 1979, he responded to the
liberal challenge and attempted to cure the defects of the classical realism of
Hans Morgenthau with his more scientific approach, which became known as
structural realism or neorealism. Whereas Morgenthau rooted his theory in the
struggle for power, which he related to human nature, Waltz made an effort to
avoid any philosophical discussion of human nature and set out instead to
build a theory of international politics analogous to microeconomics. He argues
that states in the international system are like firms in a domestic economy
and have the same fundamental interest: to survive. “Internationally, the
environment of states’ actions, or the structure of their system, is set by the
fact that some states prefer survival over other ends obtainable in the short
run and act with relative efficiency to achieve that end” (93).
Waltz maintains that
by paying attention to the individual state, and to ideological, moral, and
economic issues, both traditional liberals and classical realists make the same
mistake. They fail to develop a serious account of the international system—one
that can be abstracted from the wider socio-political domain. Waltz
acknowledges that such an abstraction distorts reality and omits many of the
factors that were important for classical realism. It does not allow for the
analysis of the development of specific foreign policies. However, it also has
utility. Notably, it assists in understanding the primary determinants of
international politics. To be sure, Waltz’s neorealist theory cannot be applied
to domestic politics. It cannot serve to develop policies of states concerning
their international or domestic affairs. His theory helps only to explain why
states behave in similar ways despite their different forms of government and
diverse political ideologies, and why, despite their growing interdependence,
the overall picture of international relations is unlikely to change.
According to Waltz,
the uniform behavior of states over centuries can be explained by the
constraints on their behavior that are imposed by the structure of the
international system. A system’s structure is defined first by the principle by
which it is organized, then by the differentiation of its units, and finally by
the distribution of capabilities (power) across units. Anarchy, or the absence
of central authority, is for Waltz the ordering principle of the international
system. The units of the international system are states. Waltz recognizes the
existence of non-state actors, but dismisses them as relatively unimportant.
Since all states want to survive, and anarchy presupposes a self-help system in
which each state has to take care of itself, there is no division of labor or
functional differentiation among them. While functionally similar, they are
nonetheless distinguished by their relative capabilities (the power each of
them represents) to perform the same function.
Consequently, Waltz
sees power and state behavior in a different way from the classical realists.
For Morgenthau power was both a means and an end, and rational state behavior
was understood as simply the course of action that would accumulate the most
power. In contrast, neorealists assume that the fundamental interest of each
state is security and would therefore concentrate on the distribution of power.
What also sets neorealism apart from classical realism is methodological rigor
and scientific self-conception (Guzinni 1998, 127–128). Waltz insists on
empirical testability of knowledge and on falsificationism as a methodological
ideal, which, as he himself admits, can have only a limited application in
international relations.
The distribution of
capabilities among states can vary; however, anarchy, the ordering principle of
international relations, remains unchanged. This has a lasting effect on the
behavior of states that become socialized into the logic of self-help. Trying
to refute neoliberal ideas concerning the effects of interdependence, Waltz
identifies two reasons why the anarchic international system limits
cooperation: insecurity and unequal gains. In the context of anarchy, each
state is uncertain about the intentions of others and is afraid that the
possible gains resulting from cooperation may favor other states more than
itself, and thus lead it to dependence on others. “States do not willingly
place themselves in situations of increased dependence. In a self-help system,
considerations of security subordinate economic gain to political interest.”
(Waltz 1979, 107).
Because of its
theoretical elegance and methodological rigor, neorealism has become very influential
within the discipline of international relations. In the eyes of many scholars,
Morgenthau’s realism has come to be seen as anachronistic—“an interesting and
important episode in the history of thinking about the subject, no doubt, but
one scarcely to be seen as a serious contribution of the rigorously scientific
theory” (Williams 2007, 1). However, while initially gaining more acceptance
than classical realism, neorealism has also provoked strong critiques on a
number of fronts.
3.2
Objections to Neorealism
In 1979 Waltz wrote
that in the nuclear age the international bipolar system, based on two
superpowers—the United States and the Soviet Union—was not only stable but
likely to persist (176–7). With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent
disintegration of the USSR this prediction was proven wrong. The bipolar world
turned out to have been more precarious than most realist analysts had
supposed. Its end opened new possibilities and challenges related to
globalization. This has led many critics to argue that neorealism, like
classical realism, cannot adequately account for changes in world politics.
The new debate between
international (neo)realists and (neo)liberals is no longer concerned with the
questions of morality and human nature, but with the extent to which state
behavior is influenced by the anarchic structure of the international system
rather than by institutions, learning and other factors that are conducive to
cooperation. In his 1989 book International Institutions and State Power,
Robert Keohane accepts Waltz’s emphasis on system-level theory and his general
assumption that states are self-interested actors that rationally pursue their
goals. However, by employing game theory he shows that states can widen the
perception of their self-interest through economic cooperation and involvement
in international institutions. Patterns of interdependence can thus affect
world politics. Keohane calls for systemic theories that would be able to deal
better with factors affecting state interaction, and with change.
Critical theorists,
such as Robert W. Cox, also focus on the alleged inability of neorealism to
deal with change. In their view, neorealists take a particular, historically
determined state-based structure of international relations and assume it to be
universally valid. In contrast, critical theorists believe that by analyzing
the interplay of ideas, material factors, and social forces, one can understand
how this structure has come about, and how it may eventually change. They contend
that neorealism ignores both the historical process during which identities and
interests are formed and the diverse methodological possibilities. It
legitimates the existing status quo of strategic relations among states and
considers the scientific method as the only way of obtaining knowledge. It
represents an exclusionary practice, an interest in domination and control.
While realists are
concerned with relations among states, the focus for critical theorists is
social emancipation. Despite their differences, critical theory, postmodernism
and feminism all take issue with the notion of state sovereignty and envision
new political communities that would be less exclusionary vis-à-vis marginal
and disenfranchised groups. The critical theory argues against state-based
exclusion and denies that the interests of a country’s citizens take precedence
over those of outsiders. It insists that politicians should give as much weight
to the interests of foreigners as they give to those of their compatriots and
envisions political structures beyond the “fortress” nation-state.
Postmodernism questions the state’s claim to be a legitimate focus of human
loyalties and its right to impose social and political boundaries. It supports
cultural diversity and stresses the interests of minorities. Feminism argues
that the realist theory exhibits a masculine bias and advocates the inclusion
of women and alternative values into public life.
Since critical
theories and other alternative theoretical perspectives question the existing
status quo, make knowledge dependent on power, and emphasize identity formation
and social change, they are not traditional or non-positivist. They are
sometimes called “reflectivist” or “post-positivist” (Weaver 165) and represent
a radical departure from the neorealist and neoliberal “rationalist” or
“positivist” international relation theories. Constructivists, such as
Alexander Wendt, try to build a bridge between these two approaches by, on the
one hand, taking the present state system and anarchy seriously, and on the
other hand, by focusing on the formation of identities and interests.
Countering neorealist ideas, Wendt argues that self-help does not follow
logically or casually from the principle of anarchy. It is socially
constructed. Wendt’s idea that states’ identities and interests are socially
constructed has earned his position the label “constructivism”. Consequently,
in his view, “self-help and power politics are institutions and not essential
features of anarchy. Anarchy is what states make of it” (Wendt 1987 395). There
is no single logic of anarchy but rather a several, depending on the roles with
which states identify themselves and each other. Power and interests are
constituted by ideas and norms. Wendt claims that neorealism cannot account for the change in world politics, but his norm-based constructivism can.
A similar conclusion,
although derived in a traditional way, comes from the non-positivist theorists
of the English school (International Society approach) who emphasize both
systemic and normative constraints on the behavior of states. Referring to the
classical view of the human being as an individual that is basically social and
rational, capable of cooperating and learning from past experiences, these
theorists emphasize that states, like individuals, have legitimate interests
that others can recognize and respect, and that they can recognize the general
advantages of observing a principle of reciprocity in their mutual relations
(Jackson and Sørensen 167). Therefore, states can bind themselves to other
states by treaties and develop some common values with other states. Hence, the
structure of the international system is not unchangeable as the neorealists
claim. It is not permanent Hobbesian anarchy, permeated by the danger of war.
An anarchic international system based on pure power relations among actors can
evolve into a more cooperative and peaceful international society, in which
state behavior is shaped by commonly shared values and norms. A practical
expression of international society is international organizations that uphold
the rule of law in international relations, especially the UN.
4.
Conclusion: The Cautionary and Changing Character of Realism
An unintended and
unfortunate consequence of the debate about neorealism is that neorealism and a
large part of its critique (with the notable exception of the English School)
have been expressed in abstract scientific and philosophical terms. This has
made the theory of international politics almost inaccessible to a layperson
and has divided the discipline of international relations into incompatible
parts. Whereas classical realism was a theory aimed at supporting diplomatic
practice and providing a guide to be followed by those seeking to understand
and deal with potential threats, today’s theories, concerned with various grand
pictures and projects, are ill-suited to perform this task. This is perhaps the
main reason why there has been a renewed interest in classical realism, and
particularly in the ideas of Morgenthau. Rather than being seen as an obsolete
form of pre-scientific realist thought, superseded by neorealist theory, his
thinking is now considered to be more complex and of greater contemporary
relevance than was earlier recognized (Williams 2007, 1–9). It fits uneasily in
the orthodox picture of realism he is usually associated with.
In recent years,
scholars have questioned prevailing narratives about clear theoretical
traditions in the discipline of international relations. Thucydides,
Machiavelli, Hobbes, and other thinkers have become subject to re-examination as
a means of challenging prevailing uses of their legacies in the discipline and
exploring other lineages and orientations. Morgenthau has undergone a similar
process of reinterpretation. A number of scholars (Hartmut Behr, Muriel
Cozette, Amelia Heath, Sean Molloy) have endorsed the importance of his thought
as a source of change for the standard interpretation of realism. Murielle
Cozette stresses Morgenthau’s critical dimension of realism expressed in his
commitment to “speak truth to power” and to “unmask power’s claims to truth and
morality,” and in his tendency to assert different claims at different times
(Cozette 10–12). She writes: “The protection of human life and freedom is
given central importance by Morgenthau, and constitutes a ‘transcendent standard
of ethics’ which should always animate scientific inquiries” (19). This shows
the flexibility of his classical realism and reveals his normative assumptions
based on the promotion of universal moral values. While Morgenthau assumes that
states are power-oriented actors, he at the same time acknowledges that
international politics would be more pernicious than it actually is were it not
for moral restraints and the work of international law(Behr and Heath 333).
Another avenue for the
development of a realist theory of international relations is offered by Robert
Gilpin’s seminal work War and Change in World Politics. If this
work were to gain greater prominence in IR scholarship, instead of engaging in
fruitless theoretical debates, we would be better prepared today “for rapid
power shifts and geopolitical change ”(Wohlforth, 2011 505). We would be able
to explain the causes of great wars and long periods of peace, and the creation
and waning of international orders. Still another avenue is provided by the
application of the new scientific discoveries to social sciences. The evidence
for this is, for example, the recent work of Alexander Wendt, Quantum
Mind and Social Science. A new realist approach to international politics
could be based on the organic and holistic worldview emerging from quantum
theory, the idea of human evolution, and the growing awareness of the role of
human beings in the evolutionary process (Korab-Karpowicz 2017).
Realism is thus more
than a static, amoral theory, and cannot be accommodated solely within a
positivist interpretation of international relations. It is a practical and
evolving theory that depends on the actual historical and political conditions and is ultimately judged by its ethical standards and by its relevance in
making prudent political decisions (Morgenthau 1962). Realism also performs a
useful cautionary role. It warns us against progressivism, moralism, legalism,
and other orientations that lose touch with the reality of self-interest and
power. Considered from this perspective, the neorealist revival of the 1970s
can also be interpreted as a necessary corrective to an over-optimistic liberal
belief in international cooperation and change resulting from interdependence.
Nevertheless, when it
becomes a dogmatic enterprise, realism fails to perform its proper function. By
remaining stuck in a state-centric and excessively simplified “paradigm” such
as neorealism and by denying the possibility of any progress in interstate
relations, it turns into an ideology. Its emphasis on power politics and
national interest can be misused to justify aggression. It has therefore to be
supplanted by theories that take better account of the dramatically changing picture
of global politics. To its merely negative, cautionary function, positive norms
must be added. These norms extend from the rationality and prudence stressed by
classical realists; through the vision of multilateralism, international law,
and an international society emphasized by liberals and members of the English
School; to the cosmopolitanism and global solidarity advocated by many of
today’s writers.
